Charles
H. Dow
It is interesting and amazing to note that
not until Charles Dow started compiling
the Dow Jones Industrial and Dow Jones Rail
Index and started writing about the stock
market a little over a hundred years ago,
stock speculation was regarded merely as
a game for the rich or as gambling for the
brave. Sure, there were the tape readers,
but the majority of the public regarded
Wall Street as a source of excitement -
the entertainment provided freely (unless
you were on the wrong side) by figures such
as Cornelius Vanderbilt, Jay Gould, and
the infamous Daniel Drew.
In
a series of stunning editorials for the
Wall Street Journal at the turn of the
century, Dow laid out the foundation of
his own theory on the stock market. Among
them were:
The
market is always to be considered as having
three movements, all going on at the same
time.
The first thing to consider is the value
of the stock in which the speculator proposes
to trade, the second the direction of
the main movement, and the third the direction
of the secondary movement (i.e. stocks
fluctuate together, but prices are controlled
by values in the long run).
There are three phases to both a primary
bull market and a primary bear market
(not to be confused with the three movements
mentioned above).
The formation of a "line" in
the averages indicates accumulation or
distribution
The market represents a serious well-considered
effort on the part of far-sighted and
well-informed men to adjust prices to
such values as exist or which are expected
to exist in the not too remote future.
The method of making money in stocks,
according to Dow, was to study basic conditions
and exercise enough patience to capture
the major movements. One of the few speculators
who discovered this relatively new concept
of making money on Wall Street at the
time was Jesse Livermore. He was able
to accomplish this only through trial
and error and the making and losing of
several fortunes.
William
P. Hamilton
William
P. Hamilton, Dow's understudy and the
fourth editor of the Wall Street Journal,
continued Dow's legacy after his death
in 1903. The Dow Theory as interpreted
by Hamilton forms the basis of all modern
technical analysis today. He wrote about
the Dow Theory for the Wall Street Journal
for more than 20 years. His additions
to the Theory included:
The
Averages discount everything
The primary trend cannot be manipulated
Both the Industrials and Rails (the modern
day Transports) must confirm each other
in order for the signal to have authority
The Theory is not infallible. If someone
did find such a system, then he or she
will own the world in relatively short
order and speculation as we know it will
not exist.
Determining the trend by spotting "higher
highs" or "lower lows"
Hamilton's predictions of the trends were
uncannily accurate, even as he developed
a wide following from his editorials.
A major reason why he was accurate almost
all the time was his lack of a writing
schedule - choosing only to write when
he had something to say about the market,
sometimes going for weeks without writing
a single word.
The
one significant time when he erred was
in late 1925 and early 1926 when he erroneously
labeled a serious secondary reaction in
a primary bull market as a bear market.
Followers of Hamilton lost heavily during
that period, as the market bottomed out
in March 1926 (Industrials 135.20 and
Rails 102.41) and was getting ready to
resume its long advance that would not
end (tragically) until September 1929.
Even
so, Hamilton would always be remembered
for penning the following editorial on
October 25, 1929, just days before the
crash. His words proved prophetic - calling
for the beginning of a new primary bear
market. Part of his now-famous editorial
is reproduced below:
A
Turn in the Tide - October 25, 1929
On
the late Charles H. Dow's well known method
of reading the stock market movement from
the Dow-Jones averages, the twenty railroad
stocks on Wednesday, October 23 confirmed
a bearish indication given by the industrials
two days before. Together the averages
gave the signal for a bear market in stocks
after a major bull market with the unprecedented
duration of almost six years. It is noteworthy
that Barron's and the Dow-Jones NEWS service
on October 21 pointed out the significance
of the industrial signal, given subsequent
confirmation by the railroad average.
Hamilton
passed away six weeks after he wrote the
above editorial. It is a tragedy that
probably not a great number of people
at the Wall Street Journal or Barron's
today have even heard of the Dow Theory,
let alone have a complete understanding
of it.
Robert
Rhea
The next great Dow theorist, Robert Rhea,
initially stumbled upon the Dow Theory
during his endeavor to find "a system"
for helping him make money in the stock
market. In his attempts to disprove the
theory, he became a convert. Rhea was
a very serious student, and he was able
to utilize the Dow Theory as interpreted
by Hamilton to his advantage, buying and
holding stocks in 1921, and basically
holding them until late 1928 (he reversed
his short position when he realized Hamilton's
advice was incorrect in early 1926), missing
only the final blowoff phase. He also
"played" the short side successfully
during the subsequent deflation. In 1932,
he began publishing his newsletter based
on the Dow Theory, called the "Dow
Theory Comment."
Rhea
called the bottom of the stock market
in July 1932 almost to the exact day and
the subsequent top in 1937. On July 21,
1932, with the Industrials at 46.50 and
the Rails at 16.76, Rhea instructed his
broker to tell his friends "the Dow
Theory implied heavy buying for the first
time in over three years." Further,
on July 25, 1932, Rhea sent a memo to
50 correspondents, part of which is reproduced
below:
The
declines of both Rail and Industrial averages
between early March and midsummer were
without precedent. The thirty-five year
record of the averages shows a fairly
uniform recovery after every major primary
action, and such recoveries average around
50% of the ground lost on the decline;
are seldom less than a third and more
than two thirds. Such recovery periods
tend to run to about 40 days, but are
sometimes only three weeks - and occasionally
three months.
The
time element is in favor of a normal reaction
at this time - because the slideoff was
normal (the normal time interval of major
declines being about 100 days).
The
market gave the unusual picture of hovering
near the lows for more than seven weeks,
and might be said to have made a "line"
during the latter weeks of that period.
Because
of all these things, and because the volume
tended to diminish on recessions and increase
on rallies during the ten days preceding
July 21, almost any one trading on the
Dow Theory would have bought stocks on
July 19th. Those who did not, had a clean
cut signal again on the 21st. Since that
date the implications of the averages
have been uniformly bullish, and it is
reasonable to expect that a normal secondary
will be completed, even though the primary
trend may not have changed to "bull".
So much for the speculative viewpoint.
Followers
of Rhea who bought stocks during that
period and held until 1937 made a fortune.
:::
Part 2 of the Dow Theory Article
:::
more articles by Henry To
:::
more articles about Investing in Stocks
|